The New American Doctrine for Western World Defence: Its Underlying Criteria and Related Consequences Ever since, through an official document issued about a year ago, George W. Bush abandoned the traditional American containment policy for the preventive war strategy, heated controversies have never stopped.

For the European people who, following the end of the cold war, have sunk into an idle and dogmatic pacifism, the White House’s doctrine is one of the many manifestations of America’s new and irresponsible unilateral approach and an exasperation of its function as the world’s “police force”. For the Catholic Church, which in its millenary history has also repeatedly resorted to this tool, this is the unacceptable enforcement of the law of the jungle.

For many Third World countries, against which the new doctrine is chiefly directed, this strategy represents some kind of sword of Damocles they were not used to have to face. Almost everyone has inferred that America is taking advantage of its position as the only existing superpower to unduly claim the exclusive right to decide who, throughout the planet, breaks the rules of coexistence and therefore deserves punishment. Only a few dare to admit that preventive war is the direct consequence of the 11 September terrorist attacks, the only rational response to an external threat that no longer comes from a superpower, as in the days of USSR, but from an invisible and evasive enemy, who not only is in a position to perform treacherous attacks anywhere, but can also hide and seek support anywhere. This is therefore an enemy that cannot be “contained” through the balance of fear, which for almost 50 years regulated the relations with the communist bloc, but must be attacked before it is in a position to cause damage, in whatever form it should manifest.

To start with it was Al Qaeda, then it was the Talibans’ Afghanistan, now it is Saddam Hussein’s Iraq, in future it may possibly become Northern Korea ruled by Kim Jong Il or Iran ruled by the ayatollahs. Preventive war, indispensable in a country which is still obsessed with the attack on the Twin Towers, is an “open end” exercise, aimed at preventing that, in any part of the world, an organisation or a country may again deal a blow below the belt to the detriment of the United States to start with, but also of any of the other western countries of which Americans, despite growing misunderstandings with Europeans, continue to view themselves as the defenders. Bush jr. certainly is not the inventor of “preventive war”. There have been numberless examples of preventive war over the centuries, and many of these have also obtained the approval of historians for having prevented even greater tragedies. A classical example in modern times is the 6-Day War sparked off by Israel to break an Arab siege which was about to suppress it: it is indeed generally acknowledged that the surprise attack launched to destroy on the ground the Egyptian and Syrian airforce fell within the cases provided for by Art. 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, which allows a country to defend itself (without the need for the approval of the Security Council) from an armed attack or to anticipate it if this is impeding.

Another method to legitimate a preventive war is to apply to the Security Council and get it to ratify that a country “represents a threat to international peace and safety”. In the days of the cold war, this was practically impossible, because the countries which represented a potential threat to one of the blocs were as a rule the allies of the other bloc, which would of course immediately put their veto. Today, the bipolar system no longer exists, a concurrence of the fifteen members, and above all of the five permanent members, may in certain cases actually materialise, even though the persistent as well as inevitable differences in interests make it rather improbable. However, within the Washington theorisation, the rigorous compliance with international law certainly doesn’t rank first, especially if, according to the White House, the safety of the United States is at stake. At the most, Americans appear to be willing to take into account an unwritten codicil of art. 51: the less impeding the threat appears, the more convincing the evidence that the threat actually exists must be. The adoption of the prevention strategy was not a painless step, and it continues to be strongly disputed also within the USA, especially by part of the Democratic Party. This strategy first of all demands a considerable evolution of the Armed Forces, which are to switch from a chiefly defensive structure to an aggressive structure, with the consequent integration of weaponry: for instance, the strategic nuclear deterrent, which plaid such a crucial role in the defeat of the Soviet bloc, should no longer be required in future. Secondly, the switch involves a further strengthening of the Navy, of the Airforce, of the Marines and of the special units, because the country may have to fight several wars at the same time in different continents and will therefore require very highly mobile armed forces. Lastly, the country is required to maintain advanced military bases in every part of the world; hence – what is a bit of a paradox – the need to be on good terms with a number of strategic countries which are not much or not at all democratic (as, nowadays, is the case with Pakistan and Saudi Arabia), and which will have to provide assistance and supportive bases in the event of distant wars. Indeed, if the United States wish to maintain their influence all over the world, also in times of peace, they need to make the most of the two extraordinary trump cards they are the only ones to have available: about three hundred installations throughout the five continents, which are exclusively subject to the American sovereignty, and the ability to keep permanently under control, thanks to the use of satellites and other extremely sophisticated electronic instruments, whatever is happening (and in certain cases also what is said) throughout the globe. Based on the above, we needn’t conclude that America is about to open a new era marked by permanent unrest, where whoever speaks up against it risks a shower of guided missiles. On the contrary, it is Bush’s intention to convey to all potentially hostile powers the message that America will not be sitting on its hands if it feels threatened, and hence discourage potential attackers from their aggressive intentions. Of course, while this method may prove effective with one nation, which at the same time represents a target, it may prove of little or no use to intimidate a terrorist organisation whose bases are unknown, which has nothing to lose in a fight and is in any case willing to face the final sacrifice. But American are increasingly persuaded that not even Al Qaeda is in a position to act without the support of a government, and should this organisation carry out further bloody attacks, all the countries that are suspected of having offered their assistance would end up in the United States’ line of fire. According to the viewpoint shared not only within the White House, but also by a significant percentage of the American public opinion, there is nothing aggressive or morally wrong about this new doctrine. This follows the plain logic that, if somebody is about to stab you with a knife, it is silly to wait until you are stabbed to then respond with another stab, as sadly required after 11 September; it is much better to get the knife out of the aggressor’s hands, even if this means cutting his arm off. This approach does not only originate from the Far West or from the ethnic fights illustrated by Scorsese in “Gangs of New York”, as the leaders of Anti-Americanism sometimes seem to think, but also from the work of influential writers, such as the theologian Reinhold Niebuhr, George Kennan or, more recently, Robert Kagan. At present, this approach appears particularly convincing, since America, unless taken unawares, benefits from such a military (as well as diplomatic and economic) superiority over the rest of the world, that it proves almost invincible. These convictions tend to manifest in the form of ill conceal contempt for the foreign countries – European countries in particular - which expect their opinion to be asked beforehand on every decision, put a brake on the decisions of the White House and are afraid – to quote a famous definition by Harold Nicolson – that “the future of the world may be in the hands of a bird-brained giant”. Americans have taken note of the negative reactions to Bush’s policy in Iraq, not only in the governments of France, Germany and other major countries, but also in the public opinion of those who have more or less clearly pronounced in favour of the United States. But they very well recall that anti-Americanism, neutralism and pacifism – or a mix of these three approaches – were also quite widespread in the days of the cold war, when Europe could not dispense with American protection, and that hundreds of thousands of Europeans took to the streets to protest against the war in Vietnam, against the deployment of Cruise missiles in Germany, Great Britain and Italy and against the Middle East policy, without this involving any irreparable damage. But now that the United States are in the front line, and Europe runs relatively lower risks, our tendency to keep a low profile is deemed almost a betrayal. Hence the increasing number of articles and papers stressing how, following the end of the bipolar world, Europe has not only lost its traditional central role, but also its driving force, which it is unsuccessfully trying to recover through an questionable foreign and common security policy. After Chirac’s and Schroeder’s stance against the American interventionism in Iraq, Thomas L. Friedman, one of the most influential “liberal” opinion-makers, has published in the New York Times such an emblematic article, that it is worthwhile quoting it almost in full: “Excuse me” he writes” if I don’t take Europeans’ complaints about Bush’s policy in Iraq seriously. I don’t take them seriously for a very simple reason: they are not serious. I am not saying that one cannot enter serious objections against the war. There are plenty. But Chirac’s and Schroeder’s are not. They are the objections of those who believe the official Arab press and, on the other hand, neglect the hopes of the young people in the Middle East that democratic regimes may at last be established in this region. They are the objections of those who would rather leave Saddam where he is than endanger their small interests, and of those who, in order to be different from Americans, smoke carcinogenic cigarettes but refuse harmless transgenic food. This behaviour reflects Europe’s weakness. Being weak, after having been powerful, is not at all nice. It may make you stupid. It may lead you to reject the American policy with the only purpose of appearing different from the only superpower that is left. said Josef Joffe, the director of “Zeit” . At the moment we are going through the most difficult post-war watershed, where huge strategic and ethical problems need to be solved, and the only response that many Europeans are capable of providing is to restrain and contain American power. And possibly, in this way, they end up taking Saddam’s side, in an intellectually corrupt position. There is a structural gap, now, between America and Europe, a gap resulting from the enormous difference that exists in terms of power: this gap produces resentment, uncertainty and petty distinctions as to what represents a legitimate use of power. I can understand and tolerate such differences. But I cannot stand the cynicism and fears of Europeans, especially when they parade their alleged moral superiority”. If this is what an “opinion maker” who is rather critical of Bush’s government thinks, it is easy to imagine in what mood Rumsfeld, Wolfowitz and Condoleeza Rice, identified as the hawks of the White House, may be, or else the attitude of the media supporting the Republican party. Some time ago, when the enemy was the Soviet Union, Americans needed everyone’s support and were much more tolerant of our weaknesses. Furthermore they knew that, either for fear or out of mere opportunism, in the end we would in any case fall into line. Now that there are many different, but also weak, enemies, they can easily do without the Europeans – at least from a military point of view. Indeed, with the exception of Great Britain, they do not even expect much from us during the critical stage of conflicts. But as we become more irrelevant, as we play an indirect role with the countries which the United States deem as a threat for their safety, they become increasingly intolerant of our fears and of our criticism. Where this is likely to lead us in three, five or ten years is one of the great questions of our age.

Translated by interpres sas

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