Numbering among the ten new ‘tenants’, who, on May 1 2004, will join the common European ‘abode’, Poland will be at the same time the most important, the most intrusive and probably also the most troublesome. With a surface area that is just bigger than Italy and 39 million inhabitants, Poland stands beside Spain in the second category and demands to be placed in the leading group: in fact, even before becoming an official member of the European Union, Warsaw has made a binding agreement with Madrid to reject all efforts to tone down its importance in the European Council, forestalling such specifications in Giscard d’Estaing’s draft of a Constitution.
The most frequent remark in Brussels is: “Nobody expected Poland to come to the table of negotiations with such arrogance”.
But Eurocrats will be wise to get accustomed to it since they have only tasted the ‘starter’ so far. The leading nation in the former Warsaw Pact has, in fact, decided to make its reasons heard tous azimut, perfectly aware that its geographical position and history could make it a key member of the club.
On the whole the Polish are pleased to be reunited with the large European family, whom they have been separated from for half a century and which they are proud to belong to (77.45% voted yes in the referendum concerning the entry into the EU), but they are willing neither to let Brussels walk over them nor to accept transfers of leadership that could, in some way, undermine their precious independence. After being divided from 1772 to 1919 between Germany, Austria and Russia and from 1939 to 1945 between the Soviet Union and the Third Reich, followed by another 45 years under Moscow, for the past fourteen years Poland has been enjoying – despite a thousand difficulties – the first period of freedom and of democracy in its modern history, and, somewhat like our Umberto Bossi, proudly says no to a “central superstate” that demands to exercise too much power in its internal affairs. Warsaw’s relations with the European Union have been contradictory and ambiguous from the start. On the one hand, Poland has been in the forefront in requesting to enter the EU after the fall of the wall of Berlin, implementing, since the early ‘90s, a radical economic reform, moving more speedily than other former communist countries from an economy of control to a market economy. On the other hand, it has immediately played it safe in facing the most delicate issues, digging in its heels when it had to and not shrinking back from forcing Brussels to hard decisions, something others could not afford to do. The Polish probably expected the EU to be willing to pay a certain price or to offer a reward for being the first East European country to rebel against Soviet power, for having played a decisive role in the fall of the wall of Berlin and for having approved the re-unification of Germany, without a fuss.
They were extremely disappointed when they realized this credit existed only in their imagination, thus experiencing a spell of doubt concerning how advisable it would be to join the club. After all, by joining the NATO (strongly wished by the Americans) they had solved their problems of safety concerning Russia. Besides, economically the membership did not promise to be a big deal. The obligation to adjust to the European Community’s legislation in the short term, the need to resize or even to close obsolete factories, the prospect of becoming the guardians of the EU’s Eastern border, at the expense of profitable cross-border business with Ukraine and Byelorussia, were also considered obstacles on the road to development.
The most delicate issue negotiated was farming, which is of vital importance for Poland. It had gone through almost half a century of Communism virtually unscathed, since the Gomulkas and Giereks had never had the courage to carry out a Soviet type nationalization of the land. Besides Moscow preferred to close both eyes on this anomaly rather than risk repeating the kulaki tragedy in the restless western borders of its empire. Hence, when the regime changed, Poland found its territory divided in private properties, each with an average size of eight hectares, which to date give employment to one fifth of the active population (against less than 4% in the European Union) and whose methods of cultivation are extremely outdated. Trying to be positive, only the productivity of one fourth of these farms is acceptable, placing the nation in a condition to compete with West European farms. But their very number has given Polish farmers, united in the farmers’ party, political importance and right from the start they did their utmost to influence negotiations and obtain the best possible conditions from Brussels. Stands were quite distant at the onset. Warsaw demanded that its farmers should be recognized the same generous grants currently allocated by the Common Agricultural Policy and which absorb 40 per cent of the EU’s budget. Brussels decidedly refused to offer Poland this treatment (and, subsequently, Hungary and other new members marked by a strong agricultural vocation) as it would have upset the EU budget. Following an endless tug-of-war, the Polish government was satisfied, as a first step, with only 25% of what is due to farmers in the Fifteen EU nations, to gradually rise to one hundred per cent only after a long period of transition. The farmers naturally rebelled, forming the skeleton of the anti-European party. Not even the referendum succeeded in silencing their protests: they literally fear for their survival in a country, which does not offer many chances to create new professions and where the unemployment index is 18 per cent. But Polish unrest towards Europe is not solely focused on farming. The powerful Catholic Church, which played a decisive role in the anti-Soviet resistance, is not in the least enthusiastic about joining a European Union where abortion is the rule, where the Parliament votes for marriage between gays and where a very large group refuses to add the recognition of Jewish and Christian roots to the new European Constitution. Inhabitants of western provinces snatched from Germany in 1945 and repopulated with inhabitants from eastern regions given over to the Soviet Union fear the nightmare of a return of the Germans.
The project recently begun in Berlin to form a foundation to recall and study the forced exile of 12 million Germans from Silesia, Pomerania and East Prussia (let alone from Sudeten, today annexed to the Czech Republic) resulted in a violent reaction in Warsaw. In practice many Polish fear that it foreshadows a massive campaign for exiles and their descendents to purchase houses and land in view of possible future claims on the territory. With prices ranging around 25% of those currently enforced to the west of the Oder-Neisse border, Polish real estate property would be a deal even if 1945 refugees did not wish to retrace their roots. Warsaw has obtained a moratorium for the time-being, but considering the remarkable differences in the two countries’ GDP, which cannot be bridged in five years, the problem will punctually arise again at its expiry. Polish considered open frontiers one of the major attractions in the membership, with the opportunity to work, legally and freely, in richer EU countries. With a per capita income of only 3,900 Euros and average salaries that are less than one fifth of Austrian and German ones, Polish consider even a Germany in crisis as the land of Cockaigne. However estimates on how many of them mean to migrate westwards (even only temporarily, while awaiting improved internal conditions), vary considerably. An EU study estimates the flow will be 335,000 people a year soon after frontiers are opened. This will drop to 150,000 once the initial thrust has died out. But a survey conducted by the MORI Social Research Institute refers that Polish waiting to pack their bags would even be 40 per cent of the total populace. Faced with these numbers, Berlin and Vienna have in turn raised barriers, enforcing a solution that, for seven years, will enable them to curtail the number of Polish workers they will have to accept.
Other countries in the EU, needy of labour but geographically more distant, are on the other hand ready to immediately open their frontiers. Despite strong civil pressure, Warsaw has not asserted itself on this issue as it fears that free immigration may lead to the escape of masterminds. “It would be a tragedy” stressed Mazowiecki, the former prime minister, “if joining Europe were to make Poland a country of old farmers”. Another widespread fear that is unfortunately founded is that western products will invade the country once all customs barriers are dropped, delivering the final blow to part of the national industry, subsequently increasing unemployment. Today the country already suffers from a very strong commercial imbalance that weakens the Polish Zloty, making a quick adoption of the Euro a problem, and has lost 75% of the control of its banking system.
Following strong treatment in the early ‘90s to speed up recovery, but which also counted many a “victim”, especially among pensioners and civil servants, the Polish are still uncertain about the system they wish to establish. A referendum held in 2001 counted 47% in favour of socialism (naturally in its western version) and 41% in favour of capitalism. A centre-left government was elected during the last election polls, proving to be more pro-European and open to foreign investments than the centre-right wing. As happened in Italy in the ‘80s and ‘90s, many Polish, especially belonging to middle and high classes, looked to Europe as a sort of thaumaturge of national ailments. They realize that the adapting stage will be very hard and that, despite all efforts and structural funds that will be sent from Brussels, the standard of life may even undergo a regression at first and Poland could be confined to a secondary role. But, in the middle and long term, they consider joining the Union essential to censure the country’s future in a continent that suffers no longer from old conflicts, but where rivalry between protagonists of its history remains unchanged. And we should look at relations between Poland and the United States and their role in the Iraqi crisis in this key, which we could call “post-nationalist”. Since it joined the NATO, the Warsaw government chose to play the role of bridgehead privileged by Washington in Eastern Europe. Its goal was to attract the highest number of American investments and, if possible, even of American military bases. The most obvious show of this trend was the choice of a contract with Lockheed rather than with the European production consortium, when Poland had to renew its aviation. And when France and Germany opposed war against Saddam Hussein, Poland did not hesitate in siding with America, promoting a manifesto - letter signed also by other East European governments and thus triggering Chirac’s furious reaction. Bush’s administration generously rewarded this attitude, entrusting Poland with the control of one of the three areas ‘occupied Iraq’ is divided into. Blair, in turn, did not conceal his appreciation and Italy delighted in having such an important ‘fellow traveller’ in Washington’s military support. This subsequently increased reservations in the so-called “old Europe” and in particular on the part of Germans, who never had an easy relationship with their East European neighbours.
In German Polnische Wirtschaft, Polish economy, has always been a synonym of disorganization and bad administration. This expression holds an ancestral wariness, not to say a little contempt, for a Slav country that has never succeeded in realizing its ambitions. This negative judgement has been comforted by a report of the European Commission dated October 2 2002, which strongly reprimanded the Polish for the bad quality of their public administration, their muddled legal system, widespread corruption, the nation’s weak economic growth and the guilty slowness in agricultural and iron and steel industry reorganization. This was a real notice to perform that caused Warsaw’s understandable resentment, even risking, for a moment, that negotiations to join the EU would not close by the deadline. Finally, the Polish swallowed criticisms and undertook to adopt the appropriate remedies. But this is another sign that, despite deep cultural bonds, marriage between Poland and Europe will not be all zibibbo and julep. Besides, John Paul II, the best loved Pope in the West, will not be there to tone down issues in years to come.
Translated by Interpres sas