A new relationship, marked by close collaboration, has started between Russia and the West: however, before the country will achieve a full economical and political integration, a lot of water will have to pass under the bridge.

With its final admission to G-8, resolved in Canada in June, Russia has legitimately become a member of the select club of Powers which manage together the world’s order: a foregone conclusion, we may say, ever since 1994, when it was first invited to take part as a guest in the Caserta summit, an event which proved however significant in showing how Vladimir Putin is now highly thought of among the other leaders and of the importance which is again attached to Russia in new international politics.

But what are the true colours of this large country at a distance of ten years from its transition from communism to capitalism, how reliable is it from an economical point of view, and what threat does its still imposing nuclear arsenal involve? In many respects, the country is still undergoing a transitional phase and it is therefore difficult to know for certain how things will eventually develop. Those who only visit Moscow or St Petersburg, two cities that are now “westernised”, where an enormous amount of money circulates, may in fact remain under the illusion that Russia has now assimilated the market economy and is now ready to aspire to become part of the EU. The 5% growth rate recorded over the last three years, whilst the rest of the world was slack, is undoubtedly encouraging, and the fact that, since Putin has been in power the country has regularly met its obligations with regards to the 143 billion dollar debt that troubles it, is definitely a good sign for the future. But it is sufficient to move in any direction by two hundred kilometres to understand that things are not exactly as they appear: even in the European part of the country, you will find villages that will plunge you back into the 19th century, citizen’s mean life is still below what it was in the days of the USSR, and 25% of the population, especially the elderly, live in poverty. The situation is no worse than it was in the days of the Soviet power, as it was obvious in the mid Nineties, when the system collapsed; but in some respects, especially on the healthcare side, the minimum assistance provided by the communist regime is no longer guaranteed and the weakest part of the population is suffering from this. Even though the Stalinist centralist state has (in theory) been dismantled, an obtuse, hypertrophied and corrupt bureaucracy still controls the country, making life difficult for both private citizens and entrepreneurs, whether Russian or foreigners, who may wish to start whatever activity. The delays experienced in the issuing of the laws that are essential for the market to work, still make all sorts of frauds and abuses possible. If a foreign entrepreneur has the misfortune of having a clash with one of the clans that control the economic life in the provinces, he may still happen to be visited by a platoon of bailiffs which, with the most unusual motivations, will inform him that the factory no longer belongs to him. The miserable egalitarian society imposed by communism, has been replaced, for better or worse, by a society made up by an inner circle of immensely rich people and by a large crowd of people that still find it difficult to put a meal together. Somehow, today’s Russia brings to mind the Far West, were strength and slyness prevailed as a rule over honesty and work. On the other hand, we must acknowledge that, since Putin has settled in at the Kremlin, the power of the so-called oligarchs, the unscrupulous financiers who took the lion’s share during privatisations, has been definitely toned down, and the law of the jungle has been replaced by a semi-legal regime in which even foreign companies may attempt to operate. But the objective represented by the entry in the World Trade Organisation, already attained a few months ago by China, is still a daydream for Russia, since this country is still troubled by too many industrial, legislative and organisational deficiencies. Suffice it to say that this country, with 145 million inhabitants, stretching over ten different time-zones from the Baltic to the Bering Straits, handles only two per cent of worldwide trade, and gathers less foreign investments than Chile or the Czech Republic. The bulk of its exportations is still represented by oil, methane, nickel, aluminium and other raw materials, as if it were an underdeveloped country, whereas its only industries that manage to compete in terms of quality and costs on international markets are – besides vodka and cannon manufacturers - the ones which benefit from a cheep energy bonus: that is steel, basic chemistry and not much more. A removal of import and export restrictions, as provided for by the WTO regulations, would prove fatal today for great part of the banking, industrial and organisational sectors, and would nip in the bud that small amount of private agriculture that has succeeded in rising from the ashes of the kolkhoz and sovkhoz. Save for minor exceptions, seventy years of communism appear to have killed both the entrepreneurial spirit and the people’s ability to work, handing down to the new rulers a country that needs to be entirely rebuilt. Indeed, it was only possible to re-launch the oil industry by recruiting foreign managers, skilled in the new extraction techniques, which were unknown to the representatives of the past regime. The idea was perfectly conveyed by a cartoon published by the Economist, in which Putin, at the wheel of an old Lada, tried to drive uphill a ramshackle caravan containing a bear. The young President’s choices have so far been reasonable and prudent, but although he has recently succeeded in taking over Duma – turning out the communists from the chairmanship of certain major committees, wherefrom they practiced stonewalling – he does not always succeed in having his measures enforced by a state bureaucratic machine which has not changed much since Gorbaciov’s days. Progress towards market economy, for instance, is often hindered by local authorities, especially in the 21 autonomous republics belonging to the federation, and proceeds at a reverse speed compared to the distance from Moscow. The attempt to introduce a western type landed property regime, after three generations ruled by collectivistic management, is slow to take off, if nothing else owing to the fact that people are not familiar with the new rules. Tax authorities, who in Eltsin’s days were no longer able to collect their credits even from state owned businesses, are making progress, but the feeling is that the large groups which nowadays manage Russian economy are still concealing a significant share of their income. Whereas Russians used to suffer from the overwhelming presence of the State, they now complain about its absence, especially when faced with the attack of organised crime, which has now spread through all the sectors of civil life. Taking advantage of the power vacuum which had materialised, especially during the second Eltsin presidency, the celebrated Russian mafia, which is now also well-known in Italy, owing to its unmistakable presence in certain tourist resorts, has actually created empires that are difficult to dismantle. Thanks to its financial power, it is often more powerful than authorities, and makes no bones about also physically getting rid of the officials who venture to attack it. The State’s naturally authoritarian tendencies therefore end by selecting other objectives, such as the world of the media, which in Eltsin’s days had succeeded in disengaging itself from past controls, and had become very aggressive towards public authorities. Putin has been very heavy- handed in this sector, especially towards newspapers and broadcasting stations controlled by the oligarchs who had opposed his rise to the presidency. In some cases he has hit organisations which were actually a thrall to interested parties, whereas in other cases he has hit newspapers and free TV networks which were simply exercising their right to criticise. Almost all Western authorities who have met Putin over the last year have raised this issue with him, but he would have none of it. Not even Putin’s “western choice”, that is his decision to offer unreserved support in fighting terrorism, establish a close cooperation with NATO and reach an agreement with Bush as to a reduction of nuclear arsenals, has met with full approval by the public opinion, which has been used for decades to view America as the enemy par excellence. Many people have not yet got over the cold war defeat and the consequent downgrading of Russia from a worldwide superpower to a second-rate country. Many blame the West for the 1997-8 financial crisis, which destroyed what was left of families’ savings, and for the imposition of an economic system their background was not familiar with. The greatest hostility towards the new trends is shown by the military, who before the Berlin Wall was pulled down used to benefit from a privileged status and now have lost most of their influence. Nobody is under the illusion that things may go back to the glorious days of the global challenge against the capitalist world, when the White House was to treat the Kremlin as an equal, the Soviet fleet was present in every Ocean and the Red Army bossed the whole of Eastern Europe. However, they cannot even accept today’s frightful deterioration, which has hit the status of arms, the level of communications and also the quality of life of officers and soldiers. The very idea that the Armed services of Holy Mother Russia may become some sort of fifth wheel for NATO in the peacemaking and peacekeeping operations makes them feel disgust at their rulers. Another reason for dissatisfaction is represented by the growing American presence in the former Soviet republics of central Asia, on the northern border of Afghanistan, which until yesterday was viewed as some sort of back garden of Moscow’s house. Luckily, so far the armed forces have only put up a passive resistance against Putin, and have contented themselves with taking it out on Chechen supporters of national independence with the cruel (although in fact nor really effective) campaign they have been conducting against them for the last five years. But their chances of creating problems are numberless, ranging from non-cooperation in dismantling nuclear missiles, for which the G8 has just allocated 20 billion dollars, to under-the-counter sale of miniature A-bombs to Bin Laden’s terrorists. Although Russia does not have a history of military conspiracies, sooner or later Putin will have to come to terms with at least part of their requests, if he wants to guard his back. This clash can be perceived in the reluctance to stop nuclear supplies to Iran, strongly contested by America, and also in the Kremlin’s tendency to somewhat still cover its old customer Saddam Hussein, one of the greatest purchasers of Russian munitions. But Putin knows that any concession to his armed forces may be interpreted as a sign of hostility by the White House, that is now used to no longer being given any trouble by the East Save for the case of some unforeseen turn of events, the Western choice appears in any case irreversible. It is based on a very simple logic: if Russia wishes to stand a chance to move, within one or two generations, from its current per capita income of 4,200 dollars, to the more than fivefold income of the European Community countries, it needs the western know-how, western capitals and western cooperation. In order to obtain this, it needs to behave not as a rival but as a reliable partner. In order to prove a reliable partner, it will have to give up, even though saving its face, the policies which Washington, as well as Brussels, find most irritating, such as any cooperation with the countries belonging to the so-called “Axis of Evil”, and it will also need to continue to act as a price controller within the energy market, as it has already been doing over the last year. In turn, it should attain a quicker integration, both in economic and political terms, with the rest of the world, from which USSR had deliberately withdrawn. This is why Putin and his co-operators are so grateful to Italy, which has promoted an unreserved opening towards them. The issue which may lead to conflicts relates to delivery times: the new Zar is in a hurry, because he is to demonstrate, before the presidential elections take place in 2004, that his investment is yielding profitable dividends, and that the many sacrifices called for by the Western choice will have a solid quid pro quo. But there are many people, both in the USA and in Europe, who are not quite sure about this trend. Many would like Moscow to adopt a harder policy on the Chechnya issue, where Putin is actually fighting against Islamic terrorism fringes, but his armed forces are using against the population methods which are unacceptable for the civil world. Others suggest we wait for the Russian economy (which has overcome the crisis chiefly as a result of the rise in the price of oil) to consolidate before any grants are made. And lastly some level criticism at Putin on the management of the Soviet heritage, in special way on the relations with authoritarian republics, such as Byelorussia or Uzbekhistan, or on the support granted the separatists of Transnistria (which should be part of Moldavia) or of Abkhazia (which on the map is an integral part of Georgia). In other words, not everybody are going to be taken in by Putin. What people appear to like, in any case, is the obvious solidity of his power, which at the moment is not threatened by reliable political opponents. This is a guarantee of stability, which - at such a delicate time - is what matters most.