Muslims and Europeans: a complex blend

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Great Britain and France's two different integration models have both failed: the future of the Union's Islamic communities promises to be rather problematic.
The French suburbs' revolt has brutally brought up a question that has long hovered over Europe: what possibilities do our societies have of assimilating a considerable Muslim community without causing intolerable conflicts? Answers clearly vary depending also on the political trend. But the fact remains that after the failure of the British integration model, which produced the attacks on the London underground last July, the French model too has now highlighted its faults.
Italy has so far been relatively immune to mass disorders caused by Muslim immigrants, but the police have already discovered various conspiracies to organise attacks and they have also decreed a series of preventive expulsions; besides hundreds of Egyptian parents' refusal to accept compulsory education (i.e. the school in via Quaranta in Milan) gives rise to many doubts concerning the future.
In practice, this relative calm is mostly due to the fact that our communities have been formed quite recently and they have still not developed the frustrations, which triggered the folly of British kamikazes or Parisian fires. On the other hand the Minister of Internal Affairs, Pisanu, has not concealed his fears for the future should conditions that are similar to those north of the Alps develop in Italy too.
As former colonial powers France and Great Britain were the first to suffer the impact of extra-European migration: hundreds and thousands of Maghrebi's and Africans have landed in the Hexagon since the '50s and '60s. They have multiplied through the years till now they are almost one tenth of the population.
In England instead the major part of migration comprises blacks from the Caribbean, Indians, Pakistanis and Bangladeshis who were initially called in to fill certain voids in the labour market, but who then often became the victims of the deindustrialisation process. The two countries have faced the problem in a radically different manner. Great Britain has encouraged the birth of distinct ethnic communities with their own identities and associations. They are free to maintain their respective traditions but they are also encouraged to participate in public life to such attrian extent that minorities are today represented by fifteen Members of Parliament in the House of Commons and by many local councillors.
The number of Caribbean, African and Asian citizens involved in the media, in cultural and sports associations and in the National Health Service is also considerable.
The chief goal was the creation of a multicultural society in which the various ethnic groups' peaceful coexistence was encouraged in a liberal system. Despite a series of spectacular racist clashes both in London and in the Midlands, the experiment seemed to yield satisfactory results till the discovery was made that the Pakistani community - the one most exposed to extremist Islamic preaching - was providing dozens of recruits for the Al Qaeda.
Especially second generation Muslim migrants, who were partly also well integrated in British society though resolved to reject the values they considered foreign to their culture, gathered under the banners of Osama Bin Laden first in Afghanistan and then in Iraq organising the series of bomb attacks, which numbered about sixty dead in London last July. Journalistic surveys, which followed, have disclosed that despite a thousand difficulties Christian and Hindu migrants succeeded in integrating themselves though they were often confined to the lowest rungs of the social ladder, while Muslims, especially the younger ones, tended to react to economic difficulties with an antagonistic and rebellious attitude.
Instead of taking the course of assimilation followed by their fathers, many ended up by becoming followers of the "preachers of hatred", the extremist Imams, whose activities London has tolerated for too long. Already the years that closely followed September 11 witnessed some spectacular cases: John Reid, the mulatto of Jamaican origin who tried to blow up an airliner over the Atlantic along the London-New York route with a plastic bomb hidden in a shoe and two British citizens of Pakistani origin who blew themselves up in Israel at the service of Hamas. But only after the attacks on the underground did we realise the extent of the phenomenon to calculate its consequences: never in times of peace did Great Britain resort to such Draconian laws, which in November even led to the Parliament's successful and sensational rejection of the government's proposal to extend the period of police custody from 14 to 90 days.
The French adopted a different method to face their immigration situation, which resulted both from the former colonies that were by now independent and also from the still many overseas territories (Martinique, Guadalupe and Guyana in America, Réunion in the Indian Ocean and French Polynesia in Australia): they granted passports and total integration to all to such an extent that they lack official statistics on how many citizens have Algerian, Moroccan, Tunisian, Mauritanian and other origins and how many of them are Muslims. At the same time the formation of ethnic and national communities that could have led to multiculturalism was discouraged to the point of forbidding (last year's controversial law, which attracted the wrath of extremists on France) the use of the veil in schools and public offices.
On the other hand we must say that after a period of open borders, which led to a surge of migrants from poor and overpopulated North Africa, Paris closed its borders quite soon, thus creating an army of sans papiers (illegal aliens with neither citizenship nor rights), thus causing quite a few problems. But family reunions on the one hand and first generation migrants' high birth rate led to the situation that by now about one eighth of the French population comprises non Europeans with a percentage of Muslims, which is by far the highest in the Union. As all are aware by now, the results were not brilliant.
With just a few exceptions migrants have ended up in the lowest rungs of the social ladder, something like the Afro-Americans in the United States. To house them the State built huge popular barracks in the suburbs of leading cities. They have invariably been turned into ghettos as time passed by witnessing the "flight" of other inhabitants.
The low cultural standards, poor knowledge of European traditions and a basic inability to absorb a modern industrial society's rules have led to an unavoidable consequence - a drop in the standard of education, enhanced living degradation, worse services and - the last but unavoidable consequence - a very high degree of unemployment especially among the youth. In the days that followed the revolt of the suburbs much was written on racism in France, which first formally conceded citizenship to migrants and then gradually marginalised them, refusing them the assistance they require, discriminating them in the labour framework and isolating them in the suburbs, far from the eyes of the socially refined bourgeoisie.
In fact, those who seek employment and appear with an Arabic name have far less possibilities of being employed than native Frenchmen with the same requisites.
Those who seek a home outside the suburbs have a good probability of being refused by landlordsunless they belong to the minority, which has succeeded in rising to a certain social position and which, in the wake of disorders, has become a sort of oracle for the media who are hunting for explanations and solutions. After the dramatic episodes of the '60s, such as the Algerian pogrom performed by the Parisian police on 17 October 1961, which witnessed over two hundred people drowned in the Seine and which is to date recalled as one of the blackest days of the Republic, for many years the conflict of civilisations has undergone a sort of incubation phase. If in a political framework this was one of the elements that led to the birth and then to the exponential growth of Jean Marie Le Pen's National Front, in an economic and social framework it did not produce phenomena of unacceptable dimensions at least till the economic crisis and the subsequent increase in unemployment highlighted the latent crisis. Disquieting signs that tension was rising started emerging since the start of the millennium.
Only last year 28 thousand cars were burnt in France - almost one hundred a day! - compared to the six thousand or little more that were burnt during the revolt, but since the trend seemed endemic - almost like road accidents - few paid attention to them. Now people are frantically wondering whether setting fire to cities (with a few exceptions like Marseilles, whose historical background seems to have better equipped it to face the migratory waves) is due to the lack of integration of minorities or rather to a wrong integration, in which Maghrebi youth have absorbed the worst of our civilisation. The philosopher André Glucksman's theory in this regard is rather unique; he believes that the wrath of second and third generation Arabic youth is in practice the sign of perfect integration "in a violent country that is crossed by winds of hatred and ruled by the logic of power-based relations". Rather than to Islamism, he attributes their incendiary fury to a form of modern nihilism, to a sort of destructive orgy caused by the need to show strength in a context in which it always pays to do so. According to Glucksman "I burn, thus I am" would be the motto of those who the Minister of Internal Affairs Sarkozy called the "dregs of society", irrespective of the fact that the real victims of their vandalism are relations, friends and countrymen.
In the Corriere della Sera Alberto Ronchey thought it better not to attribute the explosion of rage, whose protagonists were at least partly minors, to just one cause. "It contained everything - he wrote - vandals as in all crowded suburbs of our times, exalted and uncontrollable Muslim fanatics, despite strict disapproval such as stated by the Imam of Paris, outcasts from schools, pyromaniac hooligans, drug peddlers in war with the police or possessed by primitive anarchistic anger". If this diagnosis were correct, the treatment will be even more difficult because it could even be pointless to offer some of these categories incentives and grants. In his first meditated reaction to the disorders on the one hand President Chirac undertook to re-establish order by extending emergency measures and also "to ensure everybody the same opportunities" inviting private enterprises, the media and political parties to offer more room to the minorities. He has also promised to create a "task force" to help youth who are undergoing difficulties. But he took care not to propose the so-called "affirmative action" or positive discrimination to the advantage of minorities, which the United States instead adopted to ease the black minority's problems concerning access to universities and public services: in fact the French would not have taken the decision too well. In the wake of the French revolt other European cities such as Berlin, Brussels and even Athens witnessed a similar effect and the possibility of a sort of continental Islamic Intifada was mentioned. But careful observation reveals that problems vary from country to country. In Germany most Islamic migrants are of Turkish origin, hence they are more European and less dependent on the Arabic faith.
In Holland, where the film director Theo Van Gogh's murder committed by a fanatic Moroccan migrant greatly highlighted the local population's tensions, the majority of Muslims is of Indonesian origin.
Spain, the scene both of the Madrid attacks and of revolts on the part of seasonal Moroccan workers in the South, is more exposed to the contagion. However no country counts a concentration of potential insurgents as the French suburbs, whose redemption, if feasible, will require many years and loads of money.
Those like me who have lived long in the United States and have witnessed the bloody revolts in New York, Detroit and Los Angeles' black ghettos in the '60s and '70s get the suspicion that there is some analogy with current events in France. The Afro-Americans, who at the time were still the victims even of legal forms of discrimination, rebelled against their inferior status by putting their districts to fire and sword, just as the Maghrebi's did in Paris, Lion and Lille in November.
Since then much progress has been made, including the famous positive discrimination; besides Afro-Americans have occupied the famous chair of the Secretary of State twice consecutively. But on the whole they have remained the poorest ethnic community, the least educated and the most problematic one, surpassed meanwhile in all classifications by new arrivals from Asia and Latin America. European Muslims and especially those of Arabic origins find themselves in a similar condition today. Their situation is worsened by the white population's deep mistrust of them due to the actions of extremist terrorism.
Some of them, especially Egyptians who are quite a few in Italy, probably have a higher integration capacity than others. But in some way the merger with Europeans does not seem to be very successful. And we recall Cardinal Biffi's warning: during a politically unfair sermon he said that if we really need migrants, it would be best to select Christian ones (thus incurring in the Vatican's wrath).

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